

CONFIDENTIAL
TO

FROM

SUBJECT: Special Conference 8 August 1951

On August 8, 1951, [redacted] and the writer with [redacted] attended a special conference at [redacted] Headquarters, Chevy Chase Junior College, between 3:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. In addition to those mentioned above, there were present [redacted] (apparently a Ph.D. and in charge of an [redacted] Branch), [redacted] (a Ph.D. whose specialty is in the field of electronics) and Dr. [redacted] (proposed Bluebird consultant, a close working associate of Dr. [redacted] and a Ph.D. in the field of electronics cells.)

[redacted] and the writer attended this conference at the suggestion of [redacted] in the belief that the conference was to have been a report on polygraph operations on Korean POWs which [redacted] had been responsible for. This, however, was not the case. The details follow.

[redacted] opened the conference by stating that he had been in charge of a project in Japan and Korea in which the Army had used a polygraph operator along with a team of psychiatrists and psychologists on Korean POWs. [redacted] stated that he had had for many years an interest in the use of the polygraph but that his recent Korean experience had demonstrated again to him that there was a wide diversion regarding the efficacy of the polygraph between the polygraph operators themselves and individuals who looked at the polygraph from a "scientific" point of view. He stated that he was astounded to find out that the psychiatrists and psychologists on this Korean project did not agree in any way with the polygraph operator as to whether or not the polygraph was effective - the polygraph operator maintaining that the polygraph was very effective and the psychiatrists and psychologists stating that it was much more less effective and that it was not useful in many ways for certain types of work. [redacted] also stated that he had found this to be universally true that polygraph operators stated that the machine was very effective and that scientists or doctors felt that it was less effective than the professionals thought it was. He stated therefore that he wanted to talk to the members of the conference and (1) get their opinions as to the machine's effectiveness and (2) to set in motion a project which [redacted] could handle to deliberately study and evaluate the effectiveness of the polygraph. He stated that this could be done by [redacted] probably through General Larkin (Chief G-4, U. S. Army) or probably through General Anthony McCalliffe (Chief-GI, U. S. Army).

[redacted] pointed out, as did Dr. [redacted] and the writer, that they were in attendance at the conference under the misunderstanding that the conference was to be a report on certain polygraph operations in Korea and that they could not commit themselves policy wise as far as CIA was concerned. However, since their presence was official and since the conference itself was of individuals of high security clearance Messrs. [redacted] and [redacted] cooperated fully in discussions, particularly [redacted] and [redacted] both having technical knowledge of the polygraph.

Early in the conference [redacted] displayed a polygraph chart which he said had been run on him and which consisted of the standard card test. Following this, in a conversation, [redacted] admitted that all [redacted] employees were being run by [redacted] on the polygraph on a loyalty test apparently identical with that used at Oak Ridge (AEC) and apparently on a contract basis at so much per head. [redacted] it appears is quite favorably impressed by [redacted] methods and is in no way familiar with the more persistent and subtle I&SS techniques.

[redacted] (who arrived approximately one hour after the conference began) pointed out that he had little technical knowledge of the polygraph itself but because of his work on various committees he had been requested to look into this type of thing and he expressed himself to the effect that he had great interest in the polygraph or any other devices having to do with the detection of deception. [redacted] apparently was familiar with the [redacted] at [redacted] and with projects elsewhere having to do with machines for measuring deception.

[redacted] who was introduced into the conference by [redacted] had no knowledge of the polygraph, having never seen one or having any idea of its operation thereof. As a result, considerable time was consumed in explaining technical details of the operation of the polygraph to [redacted] and to a certain extent to [redacted]. The conference developed that [redacted] had recently come aboard [redacted] and that at present he was cleared as far as "secret" clearance although apparently known personally both to [redacted] and [redacted]. According to [redacted] is to head up an [redacted] project which is to be known as [redacted] and part of the work of this [redacted] project will be to study gadgets and devices for the Army. [redacted] stated that he could see no reason why the study of the polygraph and its effectiveness could not be brought under the project [redacted] and he would specifically assign [redacted] to such work.

In the general discussion involving the polygraph, it became at once obvious to Messrs. [redacted] and [redacted] that [redacted] and [redacted] were not thoroughly backgrounded in the use of the polygraph nor did they understand its application in so far as CIA was concerned nor were they aware of any involvements of the polygraph in various courts and that their approach to the whole situation was more on a scientific level than at the operations level. [redacted] and [redacted] to some extent were curious about any statistics available concerning the effectiveness of the polygraph and whether or not statistics that might be available were "valid" from a scientific point of view. They were also very curious about the training of operators, the personnel elements about the use of the polygraph, whether or not the Keeler machine was the most effective in the field and other related items. Messrs. [redacted] and [redacted] answered these questions as best possible using only statistics that had been set forth in reference books such as IBM. Messrs. [redacted] and [redacted] pointed out that whereas certain analyses of CIA's records of polygraph charts had been made, exhaustive statistical studies by trained individuals had never been made owing to a lack of necessary manpower and a lack of time. [redacted] and [redacted] also pointed out that the top security officials of CIA regarded the polygraph work as highly effective but this was, of

course, solely from a security point of view. [redacted] and [redacted] also expressed the opinion that CIA records might be made available for future statistical studies on the evaluation of the polygraph if such records would be of value.

It was necessary time and again for Messrs. [redacted] and [redacted] to point out that there is a vast amount of difference between using a polygraph as a security weapon and examining it from a scientific point of view as to infallibility, etc.

The conference involved some discussion concerning other devices of detection of deception such as instruments for measuring the movements of the eye, the electro-encephalograph and some sonic-audio devices.

In the opinion of both Messrs. [redacted] and [redacted] the conference was primarily of an exploratory nature and was not a conference at all and originally scheduled as a general meeting between [redacted] and [redacted] to explore the possibilities of testing and evaluating the effectiveness of the polygraph and related devices for the benefit of the Army and other interested agencies. [redacted] pointed out that whereas he represented Dr. Chadwell (GSI), and hence, CIA interests he could not commit himself as to specific CIA interest in the matter and suggested that [redacted] discuss these general matters at a conference at a future date with Dr. Chadwell personally. This [redacted] agreed to do. All hands agreed that it would probably be beneficial to have [redacted] make an independent study of these matters. Both [redacted] and [redacted] pointed out that CIA security was at all times interested in obtaining the best possible devices in these fields and that any improvements or suggestions along these lines would be most welcome and that CIA security itself constantly engaged in research to increase the effectiveness of their own polygraph techniques and polygraph machines.

The conference ended with the agreement that [redacted] would support [redacted] interest in setting up such a project and in doing so he would talk with General Larkin and recommend that [redacted] be given authority to set up and activate such a project. [redacted] also agreed to talk to Dr. Chadwell concerning CIA interests in these matters.

For a matter of record during the discussion of the effectiveness of the polygraph and whether or not the polygraph could be "boosted", [redacted] wanted to know if any tests had been made concerning the use of hypnosis and/or narcotics both in connection with the polygraph and in connection with their general use for interrogation purposes. Since the writer is specifically working on such a project he engaged [redacted] in some conversation along these lines but specific details were withheld in this connection since the writer had no certain knowledge as to the extent that [redacted] had been brought into the Bluebird project. Furthermore, it is not known from the nature of the conversation whether [redacted] was discussing Bluebird or whether his remarks in this connection were of a general nature only. The writer merely pointed out to [redacted] that CIA security, of course, had an interest in such matters and was cognizant of the uses of such drugs as sodium amytal, scopolamine, etc. and that

research was being carried on in general from a security point of view along these lines. It was also pointed out at this time to ~~Mr. [redacted]~~ that because of extremely severe security measures in connection with these matters that discussions along these lines was hampered. The writer stated that he hoped in the near future under different circumstances to be able to discuss such matters with ~~Mr. [redacted]~~ officially since ~~Mr. [redacted]~~ showed a rather keen interest in this direction.

SPECIAL COMMENTS: In the opinion of the writer and Messrs. ~~Mr. [redacted]~~ and ~~Mr. [redacted]~~ our representation at this conference was unnecessary. A great deal of time was wasted in explaining elementary things and in academic discussions of the value of the polygraph which had no bearing on Mr. ~~Mr. [redacted]~~'s work, security matters or other elements mentioned above. Mr. ~~Mr. [redacted]~~ and Mr. ~~Mr. [redacted]~~ specifically pointed out that policy matters involving the use of the polygraph came from higher authority and that their only concern was in the specific operation in the use of that instrument. Both Mr. ~~Mr. [redacted]~~ and Mr. ~~Mr. [redacted]~~ held the position that the polygraph as used by Security CIA is a very effective weapon from a security point of view. Both Messrs. ~~Mr. [redacted]~~ and ~~Mr. [redacted]~~ however, clearly stated that CIA security was always interested in more effective instruments if such could be designed or any new devices or any new methods that could be introduced in the detection of deception.